THE CRISIS
In January 1981 fighting broke out between the military forces of Peru and Ecuador along the border between the two states in a region known as Cordillera del Condor. Ecuador alleged that a Peruvian helicopter attacked an Ecuadorian military outpost near the Ecuadorian town of Paquisha. Peru denied this allegation, stating that Ecuadorian forces had fired on a plane en route to Peruvian border posts with supplies.
Widespread fighting followed this initial clash. On January 28, Peru announced that Ecuador was conducting military operations within Peruvian territory. Ecuador, on the other hand, stated that its military was operating within Ecuador but was under attack by Peruvian planes. The states disagreed about which party triggered the crisis, but both countries mobilized forces in the border region. Peru claimed that Ecuadorian troops had moved 8 to 12 kilometers within Peruvian territory, and deadly fighting broke out between the two sides.
This crisis was the latest in a long chain of conflicts between Peru and Ecuador stemming from a disagreement about where the border between these two countries falls, but this 1981 crisis represented the most violent flare-up in the region since the 1940s.
BACKGROUND
Peru and Ecuador are neighboring countries in northwestern South America. The geography of each country is dominated by the Andes Mountains, and both countries border the Pacific Ocean. The countries share a common history, each having been colonized by Spain in the 1500s, and both have struggled to overcome the political and economic legacies of this colonization. The shared characteristics of these countries, though, do not mean that the people or the leaders of Peru and Ecuador share a similar perspective on all issues. Rather, relations between these two countries have been tense-often turning violent-since the 1800s. The main source of conflict between the two countries has been persistent disagreement about the border between the two countries.
The question of where Peruvian territory ends and Ecuadorian territory begins is rooted in the colonial era. As Spain's South American empire began to break apart, little effort was made to clarify or specify official territorial divisions. Peru and Ecuador both lay claim to some of the same tracts of territory in northern Peru and southern Ecuador. These conflicting territorial claims have led to more than thirty violent clashes between the two countries.
Until 1941, fighting between Peruvian and Ecuadorian forces, resulting from their conflicting claims, had been troubling, but each violent flare-up was relatively short-lived. In 1941, this trend changed: The more-powerful Peru invaded Ecuadorian territory. The occupation by Peruvian forces led to four months of brutal fighting between the two states.
As the fighting continued, the depth and complexity of the dispute between Peru and Ecuador became apparent to all parties, including the hemispheric neighbors of these two countries. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States were intent on securing peace within the Western Hemisphere as World War II raged in Europe and the Pacific, and the four powers drew up a plan to end the fighting by dividing the disputed territory between Peru and Ecuador. The leaders of both Peru and Ecuador agreed to the conditions of this agreement, known as the Rio Protocol, and signed a treaty codifying the agreement in 1942, despite the fact that Ecuador lost about 5,000 square miles of territory. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States agreed to serve as the "guarantors" of the agreement. These four large powers agreed to watch over developments in the relationship between Peru and Ecuador. Any escalation of tensions between the two belligerent states would prompt involvement by guarantor states to. Such a design was intended to insure that the parties would continue to recognize and support the conditions of the agreement.
For years, Ecuadorian officials voiced displeasure with the agreement, claiming that they had been unfairly forced to sign the Protocol. After all, they noted, Ecuador was under Peruvian occupation when the agreement was proposed. This vulnerable position made it almost impossible for Ecuador's leaders to question the agreement. Subsequent discoveries about the location of historical Ecuadorian settlements intensified Ecuador's objections to the settlement detailed in the Rio Protocol. In short, Ecuador believed that huge tracts of its territory had been stolen from the country in 1942. Leaders and the public alike considered this to be a national embarrassment for Ecuador. But the consequences of the division went beyond just national pride.
The Rio Protocol division denied Ecuador any access to tributaries of the Amazon River. Lack of access to the Amazon, which would in turn provide access to the Atlantic Ocean, frustrated Ecuadorian efforts to improve its own economic conditions.
In 1960, Ecuador officially renounced the Rio Protocol and demanded renewed consideration of the division of the border between Peru and Ecuador. Peruvian leaders responded by re-stating their faith in and commitment to the 1942 agreement. Peru refused to recognize that any territorial dispute existed between the two countries, arguing that the dispute was resolved with the Rio Protocol.
The settlement defined in the Rio Protocol remained the recognized international border between Peru and Ecuador, but this region persisted as an international "hot-spot." Peruvian and Ecuadorian forces sporadically clashed in the region, and relations between the two countries-both on official levels and among their general publics-deteriorated. In the late 1970s, both Peru and Ecuador experienced shifts from totalitarian rule towards democratic governance, but these regime changes neither altered the fundamental disagreements nor reduced the intense animosity between the two states. It came as little surprise, then, when fighting broke out between the Peruvian and Ecuadorian forces in January 1981. What was surprising, however, was the intensity of the fighting and the resistance of both sides to make any concessions. It was difficult to foresee an end to the fighting after it began in 1981.
THE NEGOTIATIONS
Peru believes that the division of territory between the two countries that occurred in 1942 was a fair and objective settlement, a view historically shared by the international community. Peru believes that Ecuador disregarded this agreement and violated Peru's sovereignty first by shooting on supply planes flying in Peruvian airspace and, subsequently, by sending troops 8 to 12 kilometers into Peruvian territory. Peru feels its military actions against Ecuadorian forces are justified, stating that, "We are simply throwing out invaders as soon as possible."
Ecuador has demanded reconsideration of the location of the border between the two states but maintains that it was merely defending itself against Peruvian challenges by bringing military forces into the disputed region in January 1981. Ecuador's president argued that as long as Ecuador was denied control of the large tracts of land to which it was historically entitled, Peru would continue to exploit and pose a threat to Ecuador.
Despite the deep tensions between the governments of Peru and Ecuador, the two agreed to negotiate with one another after fighting broke out in 1981. These negotiations were intended as a venue for consideration and discussion of both short-term and long-term problems between Peru and Ecuador.
The negotiators could pursue a short-term solution to stop the current violence in the border region, or the negotiators could try to find a long-term solution that would address the fundamental disagreement about which country controls what portions of the border region. While considering agreements about either the fate of the border region, each negotiator could also offer concessions to the other country on a group of issues of concern to both countries.
AGREEMENT OPTIONS: Either negotiator can propose any of these agreements, but the other country has to accept the agreement in order for it to be implemented. Negotiators cannot choose to pursue a combination of these agreements; each side needs to agree to one and only one of the following options in order to conclude the negotiations. (The order in which these are listed in no way reflect the desirability of the likelihood of the outcomes.
1. Status Quo (terminate negotiations): If the negotiators both believe that the negotiations have come to a deadlock, they may agree to terminate the negotiation, even if there is still time left in the session.
If both sides agree to terminate the negotiation, the existing state of conditions between the two states would continue. Neither side would stop its forces from fighting in the border region, and the division of territory would remain as it has been since 1942.
2. Territorial Division: This option represents an agreement by both sides to change the settlement agreed upon in the Rio Protocol. Either side can propose a new division of the territory within the 200,000 square-kilometer border region. This region has been divided into 10 sectors or districts of 20,000 square kilometers each, and the negotiators must agree how many of these sectors-now controlled by Peru-should be granted to Ecuador.
Peru would like to maintain control of as much of this territory as possible, while Ecuador wants to expand its territory as much as possible.
3. Cease Fire: This option represents an agreement by both sides to demand that Peruvian and Ecuadorian military forces in the border region both stop the fighting that erupted in January.
This agreement leaves unresolved the issue of territorial division and only addresses the short-term issue of this particular crisis.
4. Accept Arbitration: This decision represents an agreement by both sides to let a third party (another country or an international institution) evaluate the existing division of the disputed border territory. If the parties agree to arbitration, both states will be obligated to accept the findings of the arbitrator--be it to allow Peru to retain control of all of its territory (as Peru would want), to grant Ecuador control over the whole disputed region (as Ecuador would want), or to divide the territory between the two states. The arbitrator-not the state's negotiators-will serve as the final determinant of which state controls what.
OPT-OUT OPTIONS: The governments of both Peru and Ecuador have granted their negotiators a significant amount of power. If either negotiator believes that it would be necessary or desirable to do so, each has the power to forego the pursuit of an agreement between the countries. Such a move does not require the agreement of the other side, but once one negotiator decides to pursue this course of action, that side "opts out" of the negotiation, and the negotiations are terminated.
1. Status Quo: If either negotiator believes that the negotiations are not going to produce any type of agreement and that his/her country would be better off ending the negotiations, the negotiator may "walk away" from the negotiation session. This would represent a permanent end to the negotiations, not just a "time-out."
If one side pursues this opt out, the existing state of conditions between the two states would continue. Neither side would stop its forces from fighting in the border region, and the division of territory would remain as it has been since 1942.
2. Peruvian Military Action: The Peruvian government has agreed that it will launch an all-out war against Ecuador if the Peruvian negotiator believes this to be the best course of action. Given the superiority of Peru's military capacity, the damage to Ecuador could be severe, but Peru could face significant losses of its own and is not guaranteed victory in such a war.
3. Ecuadorian Military Action: The Ecuadorian government has agreed that it will launch an all-out war against Peru if the Ecuadorian negotiator believes this to be the best course of action. Ecuador' military is overmatched versus Peru's military, but Ecuador could manage to defeat its more powerful rival. Such an outcome would likely require a significant investment of national resources by Ecuador.
WORLD STATE PARAMETERS
Each negotiator may change the policies of its country on a limited number of issues. Changing the status of one or more of these world state parameters will have an effect on the other country, but changing these parameters is not a collective decision. Each state decides on its own whether to change any or all of its world state parameters. Each negotiator controls a distinct set of world state parameters.
Peru's World State Parameters
1. Border status with Ecuador: As the negotiations begin, your border with Ecuador is open. This means that Ecuadorians may enter your country and bring goods for sale into your country. This also means that commercial Ecuadorian planes can fly within your airspace. You have the authority to close this border. This would significantly limit Ecuadorians' ability to enter into Peru and to maintain trade relations with Peru, one of its main export markets. Exports represent the largest portion of Ecuador's gross domestic product (GDP). Closing the border, however, would also limit your country's access to Ecuadorian goods.
2. Mobilization of troops: As the negotiations begin, you have troops stationed and operating within the contentious border region. You have the authority to mobilize more Peruvian forces in order to get them better prepared to fight on short notice, and you have the power to order that these troops be moved into the disputed region. This dedication of resources would be expensive for Peru but might encourage Ecuador to resolve the dispute rather than face a Peruvian military offensive attack.
3. Navigation rights to the Amazon: As the negotiations begin, your country has sovereign control over the Marañón River, which is a tributary of the great Amazon River. Parts of this river are contained within the border region. The Marañón River provides your country access to the Amazon River, which-in turn--provides Peru with direct access to both Brazil and the Atlantic Ocean. This access makes widespread trade easier and more efficient for Peru. Ecuador has no access to the Amazon River and believes that access to the river would greatly bolster its economy.
You have the authority to grant to Ecuador the right to navigate the Marañón. This would provide Ecuador its much-sought after indirect access to the Amazon River. Peru would not lose access to the river by granting these rights to Ecuador.
Ecuador's World State Parameters
1. Troop presence in the border region: As the negotiations begin, Ecuador has sent troops into parts of the disputed border controlled by Peru. Ecuador claims that the troop presence is a defensive one to guard against a Peruvian invasion of Ecuador. You have the authority to order the withdrawal of these troops from Peruvian territory. Withdrawal would help to conserve Ecuador's limited resources but would leave Ecuador less prepared if an all-out war breaks out between the two countries.
2. Border status with Peru: As the negotiations begin, your border with Peru is open. This means that Peruvians may continue to enter your country and bring goods for sale into your country. This also means that commercial Peruvian planes can fly within your airspace. You have the authority to close this border. Closing the border would pose a threat to Peru because Peru is not agriculturally self-sufficient; given the large portion of its territory that cannot be cultivated, Peru must rely on trade with other countries to ensure an adequate food supply. Sealing the country's northwest border would threaten the flow of this supply of food. Closing the border, however, would also choke off the supply of Peruvian goods which are available to Ecuadorians.
THIRD-PARTY INVOLVEMENT
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States have remained involved with this conflict since they each put forth efforts in 1942 to secure a settlement between Peru and Ecuador and to make sure that that settlement was in fact implemented. These guarantor states have attempted to deal with escalating tensions between the two belligerent states on a number of occasions, and the nature of their reactions has varied from situation to situation.
Within days of the violent military exchanges between Peru and Ecuador in 1981, the guarantor states issued a statement urging the foes to find a peaceful settlement to their dispute. Both Peruvian and Ecuadorian leaders requested that officials from the guarantor states investigate the circumstances surrounding the events which ignited this round of violence. The Organization of American States (OAS) noted that representatives from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the U.S. would have to play a key role if any resolution to the border conflict was to be found. (Each of these states is a member of the OAS.)
The Mediator in the Negotiations
A group comprised of representatives from the guarantor states agrees to serve as the mediating body during negotiations between Peru and Ecuador. [Note: Only some of the negotiations in this simulation will involve a mediator. You will find out whether a mediator is involved in your negotiation once the simulation begins.] The mediation group is objective and sides with neither party in this conflict The mediator will attempt to facilitate discussion between the Peruvian negotiator and the Ecuadorian negotiator. You may use the mediator as a sounding board for proposals you are considering offering or as a messenger of proposals to the other negotiator. You can accept or ignore suggestions made by the mediator. The mediator knows the nature of the conflict between Ecuador and Peru and the general position of each country but does not have access to the detailed information which each negotiator will be using to assist him/her in assessing the costs and benefits of different proposals.
It is no accident that the mediation group is made up of representatives from the most powerful countries in the Western Hemisphere. These states were encouraged to step forward in the 1940s because they would have the leverage to compel Peru and Ecuador-relatively weak states in the region-to accept the suggested settlement. In 1981, the guarantor states remain vastly more powerful than either Peru or Ecuador. In fact, both Peru and Ecuador rely significantly on these states for assistance in their efforts to pursue democracy and to hasten their economic development. The mediator may try to use its leverage to encourage the states to agree to a settlement more rapidly.
Mediator's World State Parameters
1. Mediator's trade relations with Peru: As negotiations begin, free and active trade occurs between the mediating states and Peru. About 30 percent of Peru's imports come from the United States, while almost 25 percent of Peru's total exports are sold to the United States. The mediator has the authority to impose trade sanctions on Peru that would prohibit Peruvians from either buying goods from the guarantor countries or selling goods to the significant markets in those countries.
2. Mediator's trade relations with Ecuador: As negotiations begin, free and active trade occurs between the mediating states and Ecuador. Thirty-two percent of Ecuador's imports come from the United States, while 38 percent of Ecuador's total exports are sold to the United States. The mediator has the authority to impose trade sanctions on Ecuador that would prohibit Ecuadorians from buying goods from either the guarantor countries or selling goods to the significant markets in those countries.
3. Mediator's stance on weapons sales to Ecuador: As negotiations begin, the United States-one of the guarantors-is holding up the conclusion of a weapon sales agreement between Ecuador and Israel because the U.S. believes that Ecuador's acquisition of new fighter jets could be a destabilizing force in South America. (The weapons contain American parts, so the U.S. is within its rights to block this sale.) Despite these reservations, the mediator has the authority to lift the block on the sale of the fighter jets to Ecuador.
4. U.S. aid to Peru: As negotiations begin, 15 percent of the external aid that Peru receives each year to help with its political and economic development comes from United States. The mediator has the authority to reduce or cut off this aid to Peru.
5. U.S. aid to Ecuador: As negotiations begin, 5 percent of the external aid that Ecuador receives each year to help with its political and economic development comes from the United States. The mediator has the authority to reduce or cut off this aid to Ecuador.